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STUDENT WORKS
MCMULLIN'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION
MAY BE A CASUALTY OF
SOUTH CAROLINA'S WAR ON DRUGS
In McMullin v. South CarolinaDepartment of Revenue & Taxation1 the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that a controlled substance tax assessed
against a previously convicted drug dealer does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The South Carolina tax statute at issue in McMullin was the
Marijuana and Controlled Substance Tax Act (CSTA), 2 which was enacted by
the legislature in 1993.
The CSTA provides that drug dealers become subject to a tax immediately
upon their acquisition or possession of marijuana or other controlled
substance.' A "dealer" 4 in possession is taxed at the rate of $3.50 per gram
of marijuana, $200 dollars per gram of controlled substance, and $2,000 per
fifty dosage units of a controlled substance not sold by weight.5 The CSTA
requires that drug dealers pay these taxes, and in return, the state is obligated
to provide each dealer with official tax stamps that must be affixed to the
illegal drugs.6
If a dealer is found in possession of illegal drugs without the official
stamps, the CSTA authorizes the state to collect any previously unpaid taxes
and impose an additional one-hundred percent tax penalty upon the dealer.7
Further, dealers who fail to affix the official stamps to drugs in their
possession are guilty of a misdemeanor that carries a sentence of not more
than five years or a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or both.'

1. _ S.C. __, 469 S.E.2d 600 (1996).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-21-5010 to -6050 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).

3. See id. § 12-21-6020.
4. The statute defines "dealer" as:
[A] person who in violation of the laws of this State manufactures, produces, ships,
transports, or imports into South Carolina or in any manner acquires or possesses
more than forty-two and one-half grams of marijuana, or seven or more grams of a
controlled substance, or ten or more dosage units of a controlled substance which is
not sold by weight.

Id. § 12-21-5020(3).
5. See id. § 12-21-5090.

6. See id. § 12-21-6010(A).
7. See id. § 12-21-6000(A).
8. See id. § 12-21-6000(B).
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South Carolina's CSTA is by no means a novel drug-fighting statute.
Numerous other states have enacted substantially similar tax statutes aimed at
drug dealers in possession of illegal narcotics. 9 The apparent purpose of these
controlled substances tax statutes is to further the "war on drugs" by hitting
drug dealers in the pocket-book, while also allowing states to collect revenue
from the extremely profitable black-market drug trade.' 0
South Carolina's CSTA deserves attention because courts in other
jurisdictions have held that controlled substances tax statutes like our CSTA
constitute a punishment for double jeopardy purposes.'I That is, individuals
first punished in a state criminal proceeding and afterward assessed a
controlled substance tax have successfully claimed that they have been
unconstitutionally punished twice for the same offense. Such multiple
punishment, it is argued, denies a defendant the double jeopardy protection
provided by both the federal 2 and state constitutions. 3 The South Carolina
in
Supreme Court addressed precisely these double jeopardy concerns
4
McMullin v. South CarolinaDepartment of Revenue & Taxation.'
On February 5, 1994, Anderson County sheriff's deputies arrested
Demetric S. McMullin for possession of 197 grams of cocaine and 23 grams
of crack cocaine. McMullin was subsequently charged and convicted in the
Anderson County Court of General Sessions for criminal possession and

9. The following are just a sample of the many state statutes: Alabama's Drugs and
Controlled Substances Excise Tax, ALA. CODE §§ 40-17A-1 to -16 (Supp. 1994); Kansas's
Marijuana and Controlled Substances Tax Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-5201 to -12 (1994);
Maine's Illegal Drug Tax, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 §§ 4433 to -6 (West 1994); Nebraska's
Marijuana and Controlled Substances Tax, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-4301 to -16 (1993); and
Texas's Controlled Substances Tax, TEx. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 159.001 to .301 (West Supp.
1995). See Clifft v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 660 N.E.2d 310, 314 n.2 (Ind. 1995).
10. Because South Carolina does not preserve legislative commentary, no record exists
enunciating the CSTA's purpose. Connecticutdoes preserve legislativediscussion, however, and
has enacted a controlled substances tax statute substantially similar to the CSTA. A Connecticut
legislator saw his state's version of a CSTA as a means of "double-whacking the offender
[dealer]. You're getting him with the jail term and you're getting him with any fines that he may
incur through civil ... offenses. You're then getting him with the tax that 'he would have to
pay' if he was selling this substance." Covelli v. Commissioner of Revenue Servs., 668 A.2d
699, 708 (Conn. 1995) (quoting legislative history).
11. For a more comprehensive explanation ofdouble jeopardy law, see William S. McAninch,
Unfolding The Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411 (1993).
12. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "No person shall...
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
13. For example, the South Carolina Constitution's double jeopardy clause provides that "[n]o
person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty." S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 12.
14. _ S.C. _, 469 S.E.2d 600 (1996).
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distribution of illegal narcotics.' 5 Exercising the authority granted by the
CSTA, the South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) notified McMullin
that he owed the state $105,207.50 in taxes, penalties, and interest levied upon
the illegal drugs.16
McMullin challenged the DOR's CSTA assessment in circuit court 7
claiming that it violated his constitutional rights by placing him twice in
jeopardy for the possession of illegal narcotics. More precisely, McMullin
claimed that because the DOR's tax assessment occurred after the state had
subjected him to a criminal penalty, the CSTA assessment violated his
constitutional right to avoid multiple punishments for a single offense.18 For
support, McMullin relied primarily on Department of Revenue of Montana v.
Kurth Ranch. 19
In Kurth Ranch, the respondents were arrested for possession of marijuana
after law enforcement officers raided their farm. The Kurths pleaded guilty to
drug charges in their criminal proceeding and were assessed criminal penalties
accordingly. Later, the state of Montana, in a separate proceeding, imposed
a $900,000 tax upon the respondents for their possession of illegal narcotics.
The Kurths claimed that the tax was a second punishment that violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.2' The United States Supreme Court agreed.2'
Acting Associate Justice Chandler, writing for the majority,' distinguished the non-punitive CSTA from the punitive Montana statute implicated
in Kurth Ranch. The court concluded that the Montana statute violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause because it contained two "unusual features, "' both
with an "unmistakable punitive character"2 4 that most tax statutes, including
the CSTA, do not contain.25 First, the Montana statute assessed its tax only
on a party previously convicted in a criminal proceeding for possession of
illegal narcotics. 26 Second, the Montana tax was unusual in that the taxpayer

15. See id. at 601.
16. See id. Initially, McMullin was notified that he owed $21,239.13. He later received a
notice of assessment for $105,207.50. See id.
17. Granting a request by McMullin and the DOR, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed
to hear the case under its original jurisdiction. See id. at _, 469 S.E.2d at 602.
18. See id.
19. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
20. See id. at 771-75.
21. See id. at 783.
22. McMullin, _ S.C. at _, 469 S.E.2d at 603. Acting Associate Justice Chandler was
joined by Justices Toal, Moore, and Walker. See id.
23. Id. at 602.

24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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was forced to pay a tax on goods that he no longer possessed.27 The court
explained that the CSTA tax, in contrast, is imposed regardless of whether the
taxpayer has been arrested for possession of a controlled substance. The
McMullin court also noted that the CSTA assessment "is based on actual
possession."I
The South Carolina Supreme Court's effort to distinguish the CSTA from
the Montana Drug Tax is unpersuasive and fails to solve the double jeopardy
problems inherent in the application of the CSTA. As a result, the McMullin
decision would probably not survive an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. Essentially, all the McMullin court did was articulate a very narrow
view of the Kurth Ranch holding in an effort to characterize the CSTA as nonpunitive.
The McMullin court's rather limited approach becomes more evident upon
close examination of the Kurth Ranch holding. The Kurth Ranch Court began
its analysis by recalling that the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause
traditionally has protected a defendant from "a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. "29 Tax statutes
like the CSTA and the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act fall under the third
category. That is, although these taxes are collected under the guise of civil
action, they may well be punitive in character-a second punishment invalid
under the Constitution.
To demonstrate that point, the Kurth Ranch Court cited and explained
United States v. Halper.30 Irwin Halper was in the business of providing
health care services for Medicare recipients. After discovering sixty-five false
claims for federal reimbursement, the government successfully prosecuted Mr.
Halper under authority of a federal criminal false-claim statute. 3 Thereafter,
the government attempted a civil suit against Mr. Halper under the civil False
Claims Act.32 Ultimately, the Halper Court held that "a defendant who
already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to
an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly
be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution."33 The
Halper Court found that for a civil sanction assessed by the state in a second
proceeding to escape double jeopardy scrutiny as a punishment and instead be

27. See id.
28. Id. at 602-03 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-21-5020, -5090, and -6020(B) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1996)).
29. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 769 n.1 (1994). The majority
included Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg.
30. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
31. See id. at 437 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994)).
32. See id. at 438 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994)).
33. Id. at 448-49, quoted in Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 777.
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classified as remedial, it must bear some rational relation to the goal of
compensating the government for the costs and 3 4losses sustained by the
government in prosecuting the particular defendant.
The Kurth Ranch Court cited Halper for the proposition that a "legislature's description of a statute as civil does not foreclose the possibility that it
has a punitive character."" Thus, a legislative label is not dispositive for
double jeopardy analysis. Courts must look past such labels and examine the
substance of a statute to see if there is an unacceptable punitive character. As
the Kurth Ranch majority noted, "there comes a time in the extension of the
penalizing features of [a] so-called tax when it loses its character as such and
becomes a mere penalty with characteristics of regulation and punishment."36
Justice Stevens, writing for the Kurth Ranch majority, cited six punitive
features exhibited by Montana's drug tax that indicated it was not a normal,
revenue-gathering tax but instead, was a punitive measure subject to the
constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause.37 The Court found the extremely
high rate of taxation 38 and the obvious deterrent purpose of the tax were two
features consistent with a punitive characterization.- 9
The Court also found that the Montana tax's being conditioned on the
commission of a crime was indicative of a "penal and prohibitory intent."40
People arrested for possession of illegal drugs composed the "entire class of
taxpayers subject to the Montana tax. "41
For its fourth factor, the Court noted that Montana's tax applied to an
activity completely forbidden by law. There were, therefore, no offsetting
governmental purposes to support the activity (and thus the tax) like jobs,
revenue, and consumer demand.42 Moreover, the tax could be collected
equally well by increasing the fine imposed during the criminal proceeding.43
Fifth, the Court found that a tax purporting to be a property assessment
"has an unmistakable punitive character" when imposed upon a criminal for

34. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
35. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 777.
36. Id. at 779 (quoting A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934)). The Court
also took care to point out that although a tax had never been found to violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the possibility that one might was expressly recognized in Helveringv. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938). See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779 n.16.
37. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780-83.
38. Montana proposed to tax the Kurths' marijuana at a rate of one hundred dollars per ounce.
See id. at780 n.17.
39. See id. at 780. However, the Court noted: "mhese features, in and of themselves, do not
necessarily render the tax punitive." Id. at 781.
40. Id. (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)).
41. Id. at 782.
42. See id. The Court drew a comparison between a tax on drugs and a tax on alcohol and
tobacco.
43. See id.
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goods that he never legally possessed and no longer actually possesses.44 The
Montana tax was assessed after a criminal conviction; therefore, the defendants' illegal drugs had been confiscated and presumably destroyed by the time
the tax was imposed.45
The sixth and final feature the Court considered in making the determination that Montana's drug tax was a second punishment subject to the Double
Jeopardy Clause was that the tax failed the remedial-measure test set out in
Halper. The Court acknowledged that the Halpertest should not strictly apply
to cases in which the Court is scrutinizing a tax and not a civil penalty. 46
Perhaps more to show the tax's punitive character than to disprove a legitimate
revenue goal, the Court applied the Halper test anyway.47 Justice Stevens
concluded that the Montana drug tax bore no reasonable relation to the cost of
investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of the defendants. 4" One rather
stinging description of the Montana tax sums up the Kurth Ranch holding:
"Taken as a whole this drug tax is a concoction of anomalies, too far-removed
in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization
as punishment for the purposes of Double Jeopardy analysis." 4 9
As noted in Chief Justice Finney's McMullin dissent, the South Carolina
Supreme Court distinguished the CSTA from the Montana statute by relying
on only two of the features enunciated in Kurth Ranch."0 Specifically, the
McMullin majority found that the CSTA, unlike the Montana drug tax, is
imposed regardless of whether the taxpayer/dealer has been arrested. Also, the
CSTA is "based on actual possession. "'
The McMullin decision stands on shaky constitutional ground because of
this narrow application of the Kurth Ranch holding. The CSTA undeniably
exhibits the first and second punitive features highlighted by the Supreme
Court in Kurth Ranch. The CSTA, like the Montana drug tax, is an exorbitantly high rate of tax assessed for an obvious deterrent purpose. 2 Although
there is no explicit legislative history to this effect, South Carolina legislators

44. Id. at 783.
45. See id.
46. "Max statutes serve a purpose quite different from civil penalties, and Halper'smethod
of determining whether the exaction was remedial or punitive 'simply does not work in the case
of a tax statute.'" Id. at 784 (quoting Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting opinion).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 783.
50. McMullin v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, _ S.C. _,
__, 469
S.E.2d 600, 603 (1996) (Finney, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 602.
52. The CSTA's tax on marijuana (approximately $98 per ounce) and other controlled
substances (approximately $5600 per ounce), see S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-5090 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1995), is as high as the tax imposed in Montana. See supra note 38.
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probably intended the CSTA to have a significant deterrent effect. 53 The
CSTA also exhibits the third punitive feature identified by the Supreme
Court-it is "conditioned on the commission of a crime."" All dealers
subject to the CSTA have by definition55 violated the state criminal drug
possession statute. Moreover, like the Montana drug tax, the vast majority of
taxpayers subject to the CSTA will pay the tax only after they have been
convicted in a criminal proceeding. The fact that the CSTA provides drug
dealers with a feasible way to pay the drug tax without being arrested is most
likely a distinction without a difference. 6 For the vast majority of taxpayers
the end result under the Montana drug tax and the CSTA will be the same-the
tax will be assessed and paid only after the taxpayer is arrested and convicted
for criminal possession of narcotics. And assuming that the vast majority of
those subjected to a CSTA assessment will have already been convicted of
criminal possession, the result of a CSTA assessment, like its punitive
Montana counterpart, will be a tax "on goods that the taxpayer neither owns
nor possesses when the tax is imposed.""
In view of Kurth Ranch's fourth factor, the logic of McMullin is further
diminished. Drug possession is just as illegal in South Carolina as it is in
Montana. Thus, there are no governmental initiatives to be served by a
revenue approach that cannot be equally well served by a simple increase in
the applicable criminal penalties.58
Finally, an application of the Halperanalysis, questionable as it may be,
categorizes the CSTA as a purely punitive measure. That is, South Carolina
could make no showing that its exorbitant tax assessment bears any rational
relation to compensating the state for the expense of prosecuting McMullin.
Appellate courts in a number of states have had the opportunity to apply
the Kurth Ranch holding to their own controlled substances tax statutes (which
are virtually identical to South Carolina's CSTA). However, no clear majority
rule has emerged. Some state appellate courts have distinguished their tax
statutes from the Montana drug tax in much the same way as the South

53. The McMullin majority admitted as much. McMullin, __ S.C. at __ n.4, 469 S.E.2d
at 603 n.4.
54. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781.
55. See supra note 4.
56. Section 12-21-6040 provides that dealers can confidentially pay the CSTA tax to the South
Carolina Tax Commission. The commissioner collecting the tax from the dealer cannot use any
facts or information acquired about the dealer to prosecute the dealer in a criminal proceeding.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-6040 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
57. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 783.
58. See id. at 782.
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Carolina Supreme Court did in McMullin. 9 Others have agreed with Kurth
Ranch and found that their tax statutes violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.6
Stennett v. Texas61 and Ward v. Texas.62 are two cases cited by Chief
Justice Finney that may provide the best indication of whether McMullin and
other cases like it could withstand an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. These Texas cases would be especially relevant to a review of South
Carolina's decision because the Texas "Controlled Substances Tax" is virtually
identical to the CSTA. 63
The state of Texas arrested defendants Ward and Stennett for possession
of marijuana. Accordingly, the state assessed a $109,546.50 tax upon
defendant Ward,' and a $49,070 tax upon defendant Stennett" under
Texas's Controlled Substances Tax. When formal criminal prosecution began,
both defendants filed for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the state had
already punished them for possession of marijuana by the imposition of the
possession tax and that they could not be subject to second punishments in the
criminal forum.' In separate proceedings, the Texas Court of Appeals held
that the defendants' claims that the criminal proceedings would violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause were incorrect.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the Texas
court and remanded the cases for further consideration in light of Kurth
Ranch.67 After reviewing Kurth Ranch, the Texas court determined that the
tax assessments made against both defendants were punitive measures and that
they constituted double jeopardy. 6 The court noted that even though Texas's
tax was not exactly like Montana's (in particular, the Texas tax does not
require arrest before a tax assessment can be made), it still contained enough
9
of the Kurth Ranch elements to be considered punitive. 6
In conclusion, although the South Carolina Supreme Court is not the only
state that has held its controlled substances tax act distinguishable from the

59. See, e.g., Covelli v. Commissioner ofRevenue Servs., 668 A.2d 699 (Conn. 1995); State
v. Lange, 531 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1995); State v. Gulledge, 896 P.2d 378 (Kan. 1995); State v.
Ballenger, 472 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
60. See, e.g., Clifft v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 660 N.E.2d 310 (Ind. 1995);
Desimone v. State, 904 P.2d 1 (Nev. 1995).
61. 115 S. Ct. 307 (1994).
62. 115 S. Ct. 567 (1994), vacating State v. Ward, 870 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App. 1994).
63. CompareTEx. TAx CODE ANN. §§ 159.001 to .301 (West 1992), with S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 12-21-5010 to -6050 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
64. Ward v. State, 915 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. App. 1996).
65. Stennett v. State, 905 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex. App. 1995).
66. See id. at 613; Ward, 870 S.W.2d at 660.
67. See Ward v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 567 (1994); Stennett v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 307 (1994).
68. See Ward, 915 S.W.2d at 946; Stennett, 905 S.W.2d at 615.
69. See Ward, 915 S.W.2d at 946; Stennett, 905 S.W.2d at 614-15.
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punitive tax found to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause in Kurth Ranch, its
reasoning is not persuasive. Nonetheless, it is important to understand that the
CSTA is not facially violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The CSTA only
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause when it is assessed upon a person after
that person has previously been punished in a criminal proceeding. South
Carolina could assess the CSTA in the same proceeding in which the dealer's
criminal punishments were meted out, or the CSTA could be assessed against
a dealer when no prior state punishment has occurred and no further state
punishment is planned. Assessing the CSTA together with the normal criminal
punishments in a single criminal proceeding would, however, make the CSTA
tax susceptible to the higher burden of proof of a criminal proceeding.
If the CSTA is not amended and the state still assesses the tax in separate
civil proceedings, solicitors and tax assessors in South Carolina should be
aware of the possible adverse implications. If the DOR assesses the CSTA on
a dealer before the solicitor has successfully prosecuted the dealer, the dealer's
subsequent criminal punishment will, in spite of McMullin, be a second
jeopardy. An appeal of the criminal conviction to the United States Supreme
Court would most likely end in a victory for the defendant-a victory that
might enable a drug dealer to get back on the street.
Travis Dayhuff

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 8

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss2/8

10

